Jesse Driscoll

Research Agenda

My first book, Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States, was published in 2015 by Cambridge University Press in the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series.  The book was honored by the Central Eurasian Studies Society with the Best Book Award in the Social Sciences and honored with the Furniss Award from the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. For reviews and published excerpts, click here.

My second book, Doing Global Fieldwork: A Social Scientist’s Guide To Mixed-Methods Research Far From Home (Columbia University Press), is a practitioner’s guide for those considering fieldwork. I discuss the book with some friendly colleagues here.

My third book, joint work with Dominique Arel, is Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before The Russian Invasion of 2022 (Cambridge University Press, 2023). I introduce the project briefly in the video above and in more depth here. An hour-long conversation about the book (with the founding Dean of my school, Peter Gourevitch) can be found here. For an exposition of the model, a talk walking through the logic at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center can be found here. A talk at Stanford University in April 2024, summarizing the ongoing war of narratives, is here.

Reviews:

“In the heat of the devastating war in Ukraine, Arel and Driscoll have given us a cool and courageous account of the complex and fraught prehistory of Putin's invasion. Their argument is the most compelling account of how a civil war in a divided country turned into a hot war between two neighbouring states.”

— Ronald Grigor Suny

“Contrary to explanations that emphasize the foreign origins of the war in Ukraine, Arel and Driscoll understand it instead through a logic of escalating violence, rooting it in significant part in domestic Ukrainian political dynamics. In doing so, they bring to light new aspects of the war and Moscow’s miscalculations leading up to its full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

— Mark R. Beissinger

“It is impossible to fully comprehend the onset and course of the full-scale Ukraine-Russia war that began with the Russian invasion in February 2022 without understanding the politics and violence that preceded it. Using a strategic action model as a guide, Arel and Driscoll’s Ukraine’s Unnamed War provides the definitive account of the Ukraine-Russia conflict from 2013–2021. Eschewing overgeneralization and writing with a style accessible to non-specialists, the authors show, in detail, how the decisions, agency, and identity of local Ukrainian actors prevented a political solution and developed the conditions that would spark a major conventional war in Europe.”

— Roger Petersen

“The ‘unnamed war’ in this brilliantly argued, comprehensively researched, and historically accurate book began as a civil war within Ukraine primarily fought between factions of what Russia has long imagined as their world. From this perspective, Arel’s and Driscoll’s analytic model reveals missed opportunities for a fragile peace that might have avoided Russia’s imperialist invasion, where we can now envision only an endless war of attrition.”

— David D. Laitin

“The book's strength that will go unacknowledged is that it pays so much attention to all possible narratives, including the Russian imperial ones. Authors seriously engage with the notion of a civil war … not "East vs. West" – which only an ignoramus could contemplate –  but a civil war in the East Ukraine. The book's strength that will get acknowledged is the meticulous, evidence-grounded chronology of the events. Perhaps the best I've read so far.”
— Konstantin Sonin, University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, (full thread at X, April 4 2024)

“Arel and Driscoll offer a meticulous and nuanced account of the developments in Ukraine that preceded the Russian invasion of 2022. After the antigovernment Maidan revolution in 2014 in Kyiv, Russian President Vladimir Putin moved to annex Crimea in a bloodless operation enabled by the popular local rejection of the Maidan revolution and by the defection of Crimean elites to the Russian state. Events were quite different in the eastern region of Donbas. … At the root of this violence [were] … real divisions between those Ukrainians who aligned with Ukraine and those who aligned with Russia.”

— Maria Lipman, Senior Visiting Fellow, George Washington University (full review at Foreign Affairs here)

“A reader informed by the wisdom of hindsight will find the application of theories of civil war to the Donbas case academically rigorous and thoroughly researched.”

— Pavel K Baev, Peace Research Institute of Oslo (full Journal of Peace Research book note here)

“The drivers behind individual participation in Donbas separatism, identified by Arel and Driscoll, are similar to those noted in [Anna] Aratyunyan’s [Hybrid Warriors] story. The most important of them is a psychological mechanism based on political and cultural insecurity amplified by “institutional breakdown.” The two authors point to the same widespread feelings of fear that Aratyunyan described through the first-hand reporting in her book. They also mention the importance of local perceptions about Russia’s likely interference in support of the insurgency, which Aratyunyan corroborated in her book through interviews with local separatist activists. Both emotions and strategic calculations influenced the choices in support of what they describe as “sedition” that many residents in Donbas supported in spring of 2014. … Arel and Driscoll point to street mobilization, often in the form of intimidation and violence, as the key factor that put Donbas on the secessionist path. By contrast, weaker mobilization in Odesa and Kharkiv and elsewhere in Southeastern Ukraine meant that traditional elites could effectively undermine separatist challenge to Ukrainian state. They list a variety of factors, which affected people’s behavior, such as uncertainty about Russia’s response, Kyiv’s policies and institutional vacuum following the disintegration of the Party of Regions. However, the tipping model, which they employ, ultimately attributes one or the other outcome (coordination or non-coordination) to the number of people that sided with seditionist demands. If large enough number of people embrace separatism, the fence-sitters – the elites and the rest of the public – will follow.”

— Sergiy Kudelia, Baylor University (full review at Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, translation here)

“A controversial issue is the authors’ use of the term civil war to describe the early phase of the conflict in Donbas. The authors are careful to stress that they do not agree with the offensive and misleading way in which official Russian sources have used this term in the context of Donbas. They also marshal considerable evidence to underline the fluid nature of the situation in Donbas between March and August 2014, the important role of local actors during this period, Russia’s cautious reaction to early developments in Donbas, and the way in which Kyiv’s reactions to the situation there often made a difficult situation even worse. … Even those who disagree with some of the authors’ arguments will greatly benefit from its excellent survey of the dramatic developments that preceded Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.”

— Ivan Jaworsky, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo (full review at The Russian Review here)

“Ukraine’s internal conflict is far more complex than a split between pro-Russia and anti-Russia Ukrainians.  As Arel and Driscoll highlight, the post-Maidan civil war in Southern and Eastern Ukraine was primarily an intra-Russkii mir (Russian World) struggle between the majority of ethnic Russians who stayed loyal to the Ukrainian state and the Donbass-concentrated minority who sought secession.  Only in Crimea was there overwhelming support for re-uniting with Russia; elsewhere secession was resisted both by ‘antisecession vigilante’ mobs and by local pro-Russia elites for whom it was a step too far. … The Donbass separatists hoped to replicate the Crimean model but they controlled neither the streets nor key institutions in the region’s towns and cities whose names are now so familiar to us as the sites of fierce battles.  Crucially, the separatists miscalculated Russia’s reaction to their movement … When the Donbass secession descended into a violent struggle between Kiev’s forces and pro-Russia insurgents, Moscow was reluctant to intervene militarily because it didn’t want to send troops into a situation where they would be treated as an invading army … Only in August 2014 did the Russian military intervene directly to save the Donbass secessionists from possible defeat by Kiev’s ‘anti-terrorist’ forces … abundant evidence that Ukraine’s tragedy has been the result of human choices not historical inevitability.”

— Geoffrey Roberts, Emeritus Professor of History at University College Cork (full review at Political Quarterly here)

“In focusing on the decade-long prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll … provide a complex reading of the process that led to the war in eastern Ukraine, negating the distortions of Russian state propaganda as well as the simplistic analyses of the conflict that circulate in the Western politics and media.  … Arel and Driscoll allow the reader to imagine themselves in a situation similar to that of the residents of eastern Ukraine in those critical months of 2014, when predictable outcomes for political actions became confusing and obscure, and calculations and decisions had to be made quickly, with limited and often distorted information, colored by personal emotions and fears for one’s own and one’s family’s social and political position.”

— Douglas J. Cremer, Woodbury University (full review at The European Legacy here)

“Arel and Driscoll’s book stands out for its strong focus on local Ukrainian agency in the events that led to the war in Donbas. The authors are rigorous in their analysis, are meticulous in assembling and analyzing evidence that supports each of their arguments, and are committed to restoring a detailed picture of the complexity of actors and events without sacrificing the clarity of their observations. While describing the Ukrainian roots of the conflict, they also provide a better understanding of Russian influences among various ethnic (Russian and Ukrainian) communities in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. … As thick as the “fog of the war” might sometimes appear, the authors remind us that rigorous social science research has in its hands important tools that permit us to resist the temptation of simple, yet erroneous narratives. This book provides salutary reading for those who despair at the ubiquity of toxic discourses that contribute to the continuation of violence and destruction. Arel and Driscoll show that public narratives are crucially important because they define how different actors perceive and react to the events, especially in situations of uncertainty and asymmetry in information. But the facts continue to matter, and reality cannot be reduced to its interpretations.”

— Tatiana Kasperski, Södertörn University, Stockholm (full review at H-Diplo here)

“In Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022, Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll cogently explain how the 2014 Donbas war started, how it was fought, and why it was difficult to end. Most notably, the authors’ argument to reconceptualize it as a civil war, rather than simply a proxy conflict between Russia and the West, is both provocative and compelling. As such, the book provides a multilayered analysis by interweaving elements of social identity and rational choice theory while offering uniquely incisive insight into how the public narratives of the conflict—from Western, Ukrainian, and Russian viewpoints—impacted public perceptions of it prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Taken together, the book is a must read for policymakers and the general public … While the authors hold no disillusions regarding Russian aggression, their emphasis on Ukrainian political agency will likely provoke Western readers to rethink their previous conceptualizations of what exactly unfolded in Ukraine and why, including the extent of Russia’s role.”

— Robert Hink, Assistant Professor, Air War College (full review at Political Science Quarterly here)

“In Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022, Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll provide a comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian political landscape in the years preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, focusing on the origins and consequences of the Donbas war. The book’s title foregrounds the controversy over the naming of this war. Diverging from the standard discourse of Russian aggression towards Ukraine, the authors draw readers’ attention to domestic Ukrainian factors at the roots of the conflict…. This book makes a significant academic contribution to shaping a political vision of postwar Ukraine based on intra-Ukrainian compromise. Although the main readership, according to the authors, is a non-specialist audience, I would recommend this insightful theoretically and empirically rich book mainly to policymakers and researchers interested in Ukrainian politics, identity and memory politics, studies of nationalism, post-Soviet studies and other relevant fields.”

— Yana Volkova, Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Ukraine and Visiting Scholar, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast (full review at Europe-Asia Studies here)

“Arel and Driscoll seek to explain the outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.  Their primary argument is that ‘the war in Donbas was … a civil war at its root.’ … Arel and Driscoll are aware that similar claims have been a staple of Russian propaganda, and they stress that they use the term ‘civil war’ as it is used in the literature on that topic.  Compared to works that indeed resemble Russian propaganda, Ukraine’s Unnamed War is better in two important ways.  First, the empirical argument is based on a rational choice model rooted in theories of conflict … Second, the empirical work is much more nuanced; Arel and Driscoll recognize that much of the evidence is ambiguous.  The picture they draw is plausible, and their analysis of the dynamics among actors in Donbas is illuminating.  This makes their book well worth reading, even if one rejects the civil war thesis.  Not everyone will connect the dots as they do.  As they recognize, there is a battle of narratives.”

— Paul D’Anieri, University of California Riverside (full review at Perspectives on Politics here)

 Peer-Reviewed Articles

“Side-Switching as State-Building: The Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine” (with A. Chinchilla). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, December 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.2013760

“Poverty and Economic Dislocation Reduce Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Protocols” (with A. Wright, K. Sonin, and J. Wilson). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, December 2020, Volume 180, 544-554. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.008

“Social Media And Russian Territorial Irredentism: Some Facts and A Conjecture” (with Z. Steinert-Threlkeld), Post-Soviet Affairs, Winter 2020, Volume 36, Issue 2, 101-121. doi/full/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1701879.

"Calling Mogadishu: How Reminders of Anarchy Bias Survey Participation" (with E. Denny), Journal of Experimental Political Science, Summer 2019, Volume 6, Issue 2, 81-92.

"Spies Like Us" (with C. Schuster), Ethnography, September 2018, Volume 19, Issue 3, 411-430.

"With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad" (with D. Maliniak), Security Studies, Summer/Fall 2016, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1-23.  Replication data.

"Did Georgian Voters Desire Military Escalation in 2008?  Experiments & Observations" (with D. Maliniak), Journal of Politics, January 2016, Volume 78, No. 1, 265-280.  Replication data.

"Language Hierarchies in Georgia: An Experimental Approach" (with T. Blauvelt and C. Berglund), Caucasus Survey, February 2016, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 44-62.  Replication data.

"Representative Surveys in Insecure Environments: A Case Study of Mogadishu, Somalia" (with N. Lidow), Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology, 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1, 78-95. 

"Intended and Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion Assistance to Georgia After The Rose Revolution" (with D. Hidalgo), Research and Politics, April-June 2014, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1-13.  Replication data.

"Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars?  Rebel Fragmentation as Peace-Building", Journal of Conflict Resolution, April-June 2012, Vol. 56, No. 1, 118-149.  Replication data.

Book Chapters

“Beyond ‘Bluffing’: The Weaponization of Uncertainty in Russia’s War Against Ukraine” (with N. Savelyeva) in A. Shesterinina and M. Matejova, Uncertainty in Global Politics, 2023, Routledge.

“Being Watched and Being Handled," in B. Bliesmann de Guevara and Morten Boas, Doing Fieldwork in Areas of International Intervention, 2020, Bristol University Press.

"Hobbesian Neopatrimonialism," in Tajikistan on the Move: Statebuilding and Societal Transformations, 2018, Lexington Press.

"Consolidating a Weak State After Civil War: A Tajik Fable" in J. Heathershaw and E. Schatz, Paradox of Power: Logics of State Weakness in Eurasia, 2017, University of Pittsburgh Press.

"Prison States and Games of Chicken" in S. Desposato, Ethics and Experiments: Problems and Solutions for Social Scientists and Policy Professionals, 2015, Taylor and Francis.

Teaching

I teach at the School for Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California at San Diego.  Substantive classes focus on topics relevant to international security for future practitioners and citizens. 

To introduce formal language, I created a 6-part lecture series: Introductory Concepts (Part 1), Prisoner’s Dilemma (Part 2), Coordination & Stag Hunt (Part 3), Hawk Dove (Part 4), Delegation (Part 5), Institutionalized Bargaining (Part 6). This video on how to use the internet for basic research has also received positive comments.

As a teaching resource for graduate students considering fieldwork, or those interested in an archive of voices from the comparative politics field, I co-host the Raiders of the Lost Archive podcast (along with Christian Davenport).

I have served as the Academic Chair of the Global Leadership Initiative at UCSD since 2014. I have also been an advisor for twelve successfully-defended Ph.D. dissertations in both political science and economics:

Tiffany Chou, Economics, UCSD (2011), U.S. Department of Treasury.

Christopher Fariss, Political Science, UCSD (2013).  Professor, University of Michigan. 

Cameron Brown, Political Science, UCSD (2014).  AIPAC (Jerusalem).

Blake McMahon, Political Science, UCSD (2015).  U.S. Air Force Research Institute. 

Kara Downey, Political Science, Stanford University (2015).  Bay Area Private Sector.

Will Hobbs, Political Science, UCSD (2016).  Assistant Professor, Cornell Univeristy.

David Lindsey, Political Science, UCSD (2016).  Associate Professor, Baruch College (CUNY). 

Zachary Breig, Economics, UCSD (2017). Assistant Professor, School of Economics at the University of Queensland.

Adam Fefer, Political Science, UCSD (2023). Visiting Researcher at the University of Michigan.

John Porten, Political Science, UCSD (2023). Research Director, San Diego Supercomputer Center (UCSD).

Michael Seese, Political Science, UCSD (2023). Lecturer, San Diego State University.

Kevin Rossillon, Political Science, UCSD (2024). U.S. Air Force.

Contact

If you want to reach me, email: jdriscoll@ucsd.edu.

Mailing Address:

Jesse Driscoll

C/O School of Global Policy and Strategy (UCSD)

9500 Gilman Drive

La Jolla, CA, 92093